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I. ARGUMENT
A. The Ethics Accusations are III Founded and Irrelevant.
The Respondents and Cross-Appellants (the "Schelhorns") open their brief with ethical
aspersions against Mr. Angstman in his capacity as a member of the Idaho State Bar. The
remainder of the appeal brief is also replete with similar claims. In this case, the ethical
allegations are reckless, ill founded, and patently designed to create some procedural or tactical
advantage.
Certainly, the Supreme Court is justifiably concerned with ethical misconduct of
attorneys. However in this case, the Schelhorns' accusations have been repeatedly rebuffed.
They are taking a fifth bite at the ethical apple. The Schelhorns unsuccessfully attempted to
disqualify counsel in this case twice based on the same accusations. (S.R. Vol. I, pp. 123-134.)1
The Schelhoms also filed an unsuccessful bar complaint2 against Mr. Angstman on May 21,
2010, during the pendency of this action. 3 On October 27, 2010, the Schelhorns received notice
from the Idaho State Bar that their investigation was terminated and the file closed because, "it
was unfounded or beyond the purview of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct."

The

Schelhorns sought review of the dismissal of the Bar complaint by the Hearing Committee
appointed by the Idaho Supreme Court.

On January 3,2011, the Committee upheld the October

The court also denied the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of its Motion to
Disqualify Counsel. The Order denying this Motion is not in the Record before this Court.
2
ISB Case No. 10-191.
3
Although the file itself is not a public record, the results of that bar complaint are records
of the Supreme Court, and the Court can take judicial notice ofthe procedural history that
followed.
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27, 2010, decision of the Deputy Bar Counsel in a written decision. The Schelhorns did not
appeal that decision further.
The ethical accusations are a "red herring" because the Schelhorns did not appeal the
district court's discretionary denial of their serial motions to disqualify.
The ethics issue is simply not before this court on appeal. The tactical use of
ethical accusations is inappropriate. As noted in Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32 (Idaho
2007):
The Preamble to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct provides that 'the Rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.' Idaho R. Prof. Conduct
Preamble. The Preamble cautions that 'the purpose of the Rules can be subverted
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. '
Jd.( emphasis added) The Schelhorns make ethical accusations in order to cause particularly

damning (that evidence their current attorney requested in discovery) to be excluded from
evidence in this case. The accusations are misplaced because the evidence was part of Angstman
Johnson's business records (not the client file)4. (S.R., Vol. II, pp. 188-195 para. 4-5) Moreover,
although the Schelhorns' particular allegations have repeatedly been rejected on the merits, this
Court held that alleged I.R.P.C. violations:
... do not create any statutory liability, do not give rise to a cause of action against a
lawyer, and do not create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. Just
because a rule is a basis for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
4
The prior representation was not substantially related to the current litigation. The
District Court, Deputy Bar Counsel and the Hearing Committee cautioned that although the
representation at issue in this case was not in violation of the IRCP or grounds for
disqualification, close attention should be paid to any appearance of impropriety of created by
such representation in future matters. Counsel for the Plaintiffs have taken such caution to heart.
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disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or
transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 430 (Idaho 2010)(internal quotations

omitted). The Court should view the use of tactical accusations with a "jaundiced eye." Meer v.
Lilly (In re Lilly), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5817 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 18, 2012) (assuming for the

sake of argument there were potential LR.P.C. violations, they were not for Plaintiff to raise,
tactically or otherwise, in the litigation.)
These matters, having been covered, here, will not be addressed in further in this brief.

B. Attorney Fees on Appeal and Cross Appeal (also necessarily addresses the merits of
the Cross Appeal)
1.

Schism5 is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

The trial court entered a Judgment Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees against Liquid
Realty, Inc. (LRI) and Wandering Trails, LLC (WT) in the amount of$8,039.25. (R. Vol. 3, pp.
396-397.) This was based upon the trial court's finding that Big Bite was the "prevailing party."
(See Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 54 (d)(l)(A)). To the extent the trial court is reversed, Big Bite can no

longer be considered a "prevailing party," and thus, the award of costs and attorneys' fees should
be vacated.

In the opening brief Liquid Realty, Inc., Wandering Trails, LLC (now dissolved by court
order), and Schism Ablution, LLC (the successor to Wandering Trails, LLC's claims) were
referred to as "Schism." The same format will be followed, here, except where context dictates
otherwise.
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On appeal, where there is a legal basis for a prevailing party to be awarded their attorney
fees, the Supreme Court may grant such fees. Idaho App. R. 41. In this case, fees and costs
should be awarded to Schism because the matter involves a "commercial transaction."
[I]n any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined
to mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code 12-120(3). This case involves negotiations between a real estate developer and
excavation contractors (together with their corporate privies) for the sale of membership interests
and to perform construction work on a residential subdivision.

This suit arose out of this

transaction. Moreover, should Schism prevail, it requests costs pursuant to Idaho App. R. 40. It
is upon these bases that Schism requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.

2.

Schism is Entitled To Attorney Fees on The Cross-Appeal Because
The Cross Appeal is Meritless And Frivolous.

On cross-appeal Schism contends it is entitled to attorney fees if it prevails under Idaho
Code 12-120(3), and also because the Cross-Appeal was brought frivolously and without
foundation. Idaho App. R. 11 & 41(a) and Idaho Code § 12-1216.
The Schelhorns have not cited any cases or show any reason why the district court abused
its discretion in not finding them a prevailing party. Rather they simply reargue an unfavorable
6

Since these issues directly address the merits of the Schelhorn's cross appeal, rather than
repeat the argument later, this section of the brief will also address the merits of the cross
appeal.
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decision. The determination of who is the prevailing party is within the trial court's sound
discretion, Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(I)(B), and this Court will not disturb that decision unless
there is an abuse of discretion. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 568, 836
P.2d 511, 514 (1992). When examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.

Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991)).
A cogent argument on appeal for an issue that is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, would necessarily start with addressing the test that the Court is required to apply.
Schelhorns do not address the test, nor do they make any effort to show how the district court
abused its discretion with reference to the test. The district court clearly viewed this matter as a
matter of discretion. "The court is fully aware that this is an issue of discretion and is exercising
reason and its discretion in making this detennination." (S.R. Vol. III, p. 374-379.)

The record

reflects the court considered the appropriate legal standards and the choices available.

Id.

Finally, the court reached its decision exercising reason. Id.
Significantly, the Schelhorns are misstating the record in their attempt to reverse the
district court.

On page 38 of their appeal brief they state: "The Schelhorns did not file a

counterclaim against plaintiffs." (Emphasis in original). This "technically" correct statement is
misleading because the Schelhorns do not clarify they actually filed a separate action that was
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consolidated with this case.

(R. Vol. II, p. 377-379.) They did, in fact, assert affirmative

claims. The claims were through a complaint, rather than a "counterclaim." On October 28,
2009, Big Bite and Tim and Julie Schelhorn brought a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
with claims for breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory action to void the assignment agreement to
Piper Ranch, contribution and indemnification, and respondent superior (against Angstman
Johnson).

This separate complaint was consolidated by stipulation of the parties.

On

November 2,2010, the Court dismissed Big Bite and Schelhorns' complaint against Angstman
and Angstman Johnson & Associates without prejudice. Id.
Attorney fees on cross appeal are appropriate, pursuant to Idaho App. R. 11 & 41(a) and
Idaho Code § 12-121, ifthe appellate court is "left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Durrant v. Christensen,
117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990). Specifically, since the decision of the trial court on
whether a party is a prevailing party is a matter of discretion, the appellants must present a
"cogent challenge" with regard to the exercise of discretion. United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v.

Cox, 126 Idaho 733, 736 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995). Not only was the challenge not "cogent", it was
based on a misrepresentation of the record below, signed by counsel for the Schelhorns. An
appeal argument based upon a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts may leave the court with
an "abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation" as it did in McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 159 (Idaho 1997).
misrepresentation is also grounds for sanctions under Idaho App. R. 11.2.
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The

An alternative exists to affirm the district court, even if it abused its discretion in denying
an award of attorney fees. As argued below, it is incumbent upon the parties seeking attorney
fees to present sufficient information to the Court to consider the factors of Idaho R. Civ. Proc.
54(e)(3). See Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 86
P.3d 475, 483 (2004); Hackett v. Streeter 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Ct.App.
1985). For example, where a party claiming attorney fees failed to submit attorney time sheets in
support of its claim, it foreclosed an award of attorney fees because it prevented the trial court
from properly determining the amount of the award. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc., 139 Idaho
at 769,86 P.3d at 483 (vacating an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party). Here, the fees
for all parties represented by the same counsel were lumped together and the fees sought were
duplicative with those already awarded to Big Bite. As a result, no award was appropriate. The
district court recognized this issue in its September 28, 2012 memorandum decision but did not
reach the issue because the Schelhorns were not found to be prevailing parties. (S.R. Vol. III, pp.
374-379.)

C. Reply on Appeal Issues
1. Standard of Review

Schism agrees, generally, with the standard of review set forth by Big Bite, Inc., Tim and
Julie Schelhom (the Schelhorns), and Piper Ranch, LLC (collectively referred to herein as Piper
Ranch), when taken together with the discussion by Schism, which has not been addressed by
Schelhorns, in the opening brief.

APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF-7

2.

Issues of Fact Remain as to the Alter Ego Liability of the Schelhorns

The Schelhoms substantially tie their defense to the argument that the legislature
removed adherence to the corporate formalities attendant to a Limited Liability Company in
Idaho as a basis for imputing personal liability in 2008. While Schism has already pointed out
that the statutory change did not substantially alter piercing law, it is also important that, even if
it did, the changes do not apply to this case. Piper Ranch, LLC, formed on March 2, 2007 and the
relevant conduct occurred before the effective date for pre-existing companies. Idaho Code 30-61104(2) (Effective July 1, 2010 for pre-existing companies). "A statute affecting vested rights
will be construed as operating prospectively only, and not retrospectively." Ford v. Caldwell, 79
Idaho 499 (Idaho 1958)7.
While the Schelhoms clearly did not observe "corporate" formalities, this case does not
depend upon lack of observing "corporate" formalities as the basis for liability.

Schism's

opening brief makes it clear that it is pursuing liability under the standard this Court has recently
applied: In Sirius LC v. Ericson, 150 Idaho 80,244 P.3d 224 (2010), the Court states:
Idaho recognizes that a limited liability company (company) is a separate legal
entity "distinct from its members." See I.C. § 30-6-104(1) ... To prove that a
company is the alter ego of a member of the company, a claimant must
demonstrate "(1) a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the separate
personalities of the [company] and individual no longer exist and (2) if the acts
are treated as acts ofthe [company] an inequitable result would follow."

The Schelhoms' effort to "opt in " to the statute should not be allowed as a device to
sidestep violation of the law as it existed prior to the effective date.

7
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Id. at 85, 244 P.3d at 229 (quoting Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,556-57, 165 P.3d

261, 270-71 (2007)). It is worth repeating that this statement of the applicable rule follows the
effective date of Idaho's Revised Limited Liability Company Act, which confirms that the
statutory changes did not impact the law. See Idaho Code 30-6-1104. The Schelhoms do not
address this argument directly in its Reply.
It "is the general rule that the conditions under which a corporate entity may be

disregarded vary according to the circumstances of each case." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose
Chapel Mortuary, 95 Idaho 599 (Idaho 1973).

The Schelhoms cannot refute the fact that

evidence in the record demonstrates a unity of ownership exists between the Schelhorns,
Piper Ranch and Big Bite. The Schelhoms contend that since there are only a few transactions
where the identity of the Schelhoms, individually, and their two entities, Big Bite Excavation,
Inc. and Piper Ranch, LLC ignored the separateness of each other, the unity of interest element is
not satisfied. While it is true there are not a great number of these transactions, the number of
transactions are significant in proportion to other legitimate company transactions. (More
precisely, there were practically no other legitimate company transactions before litigation of the
issue commenced.)
In Respondents' Brief the Schelhoms rely on the conc1usory, hearsay affidavit of Julie
Schelhom to establish that they did not have a corporate account for their dba business due to
"bank policy". Respondents' Brief at 14. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) states: H[s]upporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
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matters stated therein." Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 56( e). Furthennore, these requirements "are not
satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal
knowledge." State v. Shama Resources Ltd.Partnership,127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977, 981
(1995). While Piper Ranch says that having Big Bite pay its bills to Angstman Johnson was a
"mistake," that conclusory statement is inconsistent with other evidence. That was the exact
practice that took place in Circle Z where Piper Ranch had the obligation to do "utilities" work
and Big Bite did the work without reimbursement.

(R. Vo1. II, p. 207 (page 33 of the

transcript).) The affidavit does establish that Piper Ranch had virtually no capitalization or
transactions. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 684-685.) The conclusory statement by the pmiy who would
benefit in the litigation, on a paper record, and which is inconsistent with other evidence, does
not eliminate a question of fact against the non-moving party.
The Schelhorns argue that the there was no evidence presented related to Piper Ranch's
involvement with Big Bite and the Circle Z project (sometimes refened to as the Willow Glen
project). However, they only cite to the trial court's memorandum decision. (Respondents'
Brief at 18.) That is simply wrong. Julie Schelhom was a designee for the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition of Piper Ranch and Big Bite8 . During this testimony both companies admitted Big
Bite did "utilities" work for Circle Z Development Group in exchange for a 33% LLC
membership interest that was given to Piper Ranch, LLC. (R. Vo1. II, p. 207 (page 33 of the
transcript).) That work involved a contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite. !d. However,
PIPER RANCH NEVER PAID BIG BITE FOR THE WORK IT PERFORMED UNDER THAT
Piper Ranch and Big Bite gave combined testimony during one deposition.
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CONTRACT 9 . Id. Thus, Big Bite provided all the capital, labor and equipment, but Piper
Ranch got the economic benefit without paying anything. (R. Vol. I, p. 165 (transcript pages 4548).) The contract was oral, not written.

(R. Vol. II, p. 210 (Page 172 of the transcript).)

Clearly this evidence shows that Piper Ranch was merely a conduit for the personal benefit of the
Schelhoms who owned 100% of Piper Ranch and Big Bite. (R. Vol. II, p 209 (page 166 of the
transcript).) Unfortunately, the District Court decision ignored this evidence. The Schelhoms'
reliance on the Memorandum Decision is misplaced because it does not actually reflect the
evidence in the record.
The Schelhoms cannot refute the fact that the evidence in record demonstrates an
inequitable result, results from Schelhorn and Big Bites' use

Piper Ranch, LLC as a

conduit. Ultimately this case resulted in unpaid and uncollectible judgments against Piper
Ranch, LLC totaling $260,000. Despite the fact the Schelhoms controlled assets and resources
that they intended to dedicate to the performance of Piper Ranch's obligations, the company was
never sufficiently capitalized.

(R. Vol. II, p. 259 (transcript pages 137-140).) Initially the

Schelhoms put in $200. !d. Later Piper Ranch agreed to pay Alpha Lending its mortgage
payment of $2600 because they had waited so long to perform their work. (R. Vol. I, p. 168
(transcript pages 134-135).) The Schelhoms' personal funds were contributed to pay that
amount. (R. Vol. II, p. 259 (transcript pages 137-140).) $150 was contributed later, bringing the

9

Thus, the factual assertion that "There was no evidence presented that Piper Ranch paid
any expenses related to the [Circle Z] project." is correct. Respondents' Brief, at 18. However,
this is an admission against the Schelhom's interest since if Piper Ranch, LLC is a distinct entity,
it would have to pay for the cost of Big Bite's performance rather than receive it gratuitiously.

APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF- 11

total contribution to $2950. Id. After litigation erupted and the Idaho R. Civ. Proc 30(b)(6)
deposition was taken, Piper Ranch did a capital call for $300 to so it could repay Big Bite for the
bills it paid on Piper Ranch's behalf. (R. Vol. IV, p. 689.) Notably Piper Ranch did not do a
capital call to repay any of the money Big Bite expended on its behalf for the Circle Z project.

Id. The Schelhorns never informed Schism that they had not capitalized the Piper Ranch, LLC.
(R. Vol. II, p. 208 (transcript page 114).)

The Schelhorns make the circular argument that Piper Ranch should not be considered as
undercapitalized because it obtained, through this ruse, "the asset of a 25% interest in Wandering
Trails."

Respondents' Brief at 19.

Moreover, they admit "they planned to make capital

contributions as necessary to cover their contribution had the project gone forward." Id. As the
record reflects, the project did NOT go forward because Piper Ranch did not complete its work.
This circular argument should be rejected and the Court should find that this internal agreement
to make and fund capital calls binds the Schelhorns and/or Big Bite since the record reflects that
Big Bite provided all the funding for the initial investment Piper Ranch made with Circle Z.
The Schelhorns argue that there is no evidence that assets were surreptitiously transferred
out of entity ownership. That argument misses the point, altogether. The issue is not transfer of
money out off the company, but failure to capitalize at all. The Schelhorns own admission that
they intended to capitalize the company if the project went forward is consistent with the
testimony of Thomas J. Angstman that the Schelhorns gave assurances that they would fund the
project by having Big Bite do the work. (R. Vol.3 pp. 476-534.) This is also consistent with
what actually happened with the Piper Ranch/Big Bite - Circle Z project.
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Without citation to a single case, the Schelhorns point to the sophistication of Schism as a
basis not to find alter ego liability. Schism was unable to locate any case where an Idaho court
has ever used sophistication of the defrauded party as a basis to deny recovery in an alter ego
case. While they make the point that the manager of this entity is a sophisticated party, the
Schelhorns fail to address the fact that their conduct caused significant losses to the former
property owner, Mick Bernier. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 216-220.) Bad public policy results from focusing
on the sophistication of the defrauded party. If a party were represented by counsel, the same
arguments would exist. Banks, contractors and others would face the same arguments.
This is not a case whre Piper Ranch ran into financial problems and could not meet its
obligation due to unrelated or unforeseen adverse events. Rather, the owners of Piper Ranch
simply treated this obligation as an option agreement that they could fund if they felt it was
advantageous, and ignore if it wasn't. That is the proper focus of the equitable inquiry. Even if
an argument can be made that the sophistication of the defrauded party could be somehow
relevant, the facts of this case would not justify new law to that effect in Idaho.

3.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the 3 rd Party Beneficiary Claims
Against Big Bite.

The record reflects a history of agreements between Big Bite and Piper Ranch where Big
Bite would perform work and never expect payment. Mr. Schelhorn told Mr. Angstman that is
how things would proceed. (R. Vol.3 pp. 476-534.) The Schelhorns concede that they intended
to fund the capital as needed and would likely use Big Bite for the work. (R. Vol. II, p. 208
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(transcript page 115-116).) Big Bite raises no new arguments in its Reply and thus no further
argument is needed.

4.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Allow Alter Ego claims against Big
Bite.

All arguments raised by Big Bite are adequately addressed in the opening brief and will
not be repeated here.

5.

The Schelhorns' Cross Appeal is Frivolous and Should be Rejected.

This is addressed, fully, in the arguments on attorney fees, above.
II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Schism requests the Court reverse the trial court, vacate the
judgment against Schism and remand the matter with directions to the trial court to enter
judgment IO in favor of Schism on their alter ego claims against the Schelhorns. Further, Schism
should be allowed to amend and pursue a jury trial on the Schism claims against Big Bite for 3rd
party liability and/or alter ego liability.
DATED this 29 th day of August, 2013.
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Or reverse the district court's summary judgment decision.
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